When Interventionism Backfires

　　Libya’s dysfunctional political system caught between competing militias offers a cautionary tale of Western interference

　　The political unrest in affected countries following the Arab Spring movement in 2011 has shattered the illusions of the outside world concerning their smooth transition from strongman regimes to democratic ones. Libya is a particularly disconcerting case， where Western interventionism has given way to an anticlimactic series of deep domestic problems. Currently， the attempt at Western-style democracy is still at odds with the troubled political climate of Libya， which is facing a tough transition after deposing its former strongman.

　　Unintended consequences

　　After the overthrow of former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi， the country descended into chaos. Intensifying through early 2014， the ongoing armed conflicts between militias pushed Libya to the edge of a civil war. The new round of crises broke out nearly simultaneously in both the east and west of the country. In Tripoli in May， the Libyan parliament came to a deadlock over disagreements regarding prime minister candidates， which eventually resulted in a parliamentary reelection in late June. On July 13， armed clashes broke out at a major airport in Tripoli between armed Islamist groups and militias from the southwestern city of Zintan. The airport was seriously damaged and the ensuing fighting has yet to end. The clashes have paralyzed air traffic to and from Tripoli. In Benghazi， the nation’s second largest city， retired Major General Khalifa Haftar led a series of military actions against armed Islamist groups in mid-May in the name of “purging terrorists.” So far， there is still no end in sight for the fighting between the two sides.

　　As the security situation deteriorates in Libya， many countries have evacuated their nationals and diplomatic personnel and shut down their embassies in the country， including Britain， France and the United States—the same countries that played a decisive role in overthrowing the Gaddafi regime. Their commitment to assisting with the reconstruction of Libya has come under question， as little has been done to break the political stalemate and prevent a civil war.

　　For example， the United States demonstrated restraint after the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi was targeted in an attack that killed the U.S. ambassador in September 2012. With comparatively little at stake in Libya， the Obama administration has turned its focus away from the war-torn country. Most observers agree that Libya， which is beset with enormous difficulties in carrying out its political transition and reconstruction， must manage the crisis largely on its own without the help of the United States or any other third party.

　　Clarifying chaos

　　Three factors are complicating efforts to end the current chaotic situation in Libya.

　　First， the Libyan Government is unable to control militia forces， each of which occupies an area of its own in the country. The civil war in 2011 has resulted in the emergence of several competing groups. Claiming credit for the war’s success， these militias are unwilling to give up their weapons or dissolve. On the contrary， some forces that did not even participate in the fighting have formed new militias in an attempt to have a bigger say in post-war power-sharing arrangements. The militia forces are extremely complex—with different origins and competing ideologies—and their interests vary widely. This explosive mixture is bound to create an increasing number of armed conflicts.

　　After the civil war， successive Libyan governments have made efforts to establish a cohesive national army. For instance， the Ministry of Internal Affairs has established the Supreme Security Committee as a parallel security force to the army and police， the Ministry of Defense has set up the Libya Shield Force， and former Libyan Prime Minister Ali Zeidan pushed for the creation of a national guard when he was in office. All these forces are made up of anti-Gaddafi elements. But in practice， these factions attach more importance to the interests of their own organizations， and do not take orders from central authorities. There is little unity and coordination among the forces， some of which have attempted to blackmail the Libyan Government by asking for higher salaries or promotions. The so-called government troops are actually still mercenaries， and are incapable of suppressing militia groups.

　　Second， a two-camp political structure has slowly taken shape in Libya with Islamist groups pitted against pro-secular forces. Islamist militias were the major force behind the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime. After the civil war， Islamist groups were unwilling to share power with the remnants of the Gaddafi regime—not even the defectors. In May 2013， Islamist groups including the Muslim Brotherhood pushed the Libyan parliament to enact new laws prohibiting former officials of the Gaddafi regime from participating in government and political affairs. The influence of Islamist groups in the parliament continues to grow. Since the beginning of this year， Islamist groups pushed the parliament to cast a vote of no confidence against the secularist Prime Minister Zeidan， which finally led to his stepping down in March. The two camps then underwent a public split， with military conflicts following soon afterward.

　　Third， in terms of modern nation-states， Libya is still at an immature stage. At the beginning of the 20th century， Western colonists invaded the region and forcibly merged Tripolitania in the west， Cyrenaica in the east and Fezzan in the south into one country—Libya. Tripoli was made the political and economic center of the country， thus planting the seeds for disunity in Cyrenaica and Fezzan.

　　The people of Cyrenaica suffered greatly from discrimination under Gaddafi’s reign， making them eager participants in the anti-Gaddafi movement. This group also sought more power after the war. Early in March 2012， some of the elites in east Libya held meetings to declare the area’s autonomy. Though the common people in the region do not have much aspiration for independence or autonomy， they still demand more political power and greater economic interests.

　　Militarily， there are numerous armed forces in the east that are independent of the Tripoli authority， whether they are Haftar’s self-proclaimed “national army” or Islamist militants groups. In this sense， it is not an exaggeration to say that there are two governments and several armies in the country.

　　The deviating tendencies also extend to the economic sphere. After the civil war， the Libyan Government established the Petroleum Facilities Guard to defend oil facilities. The production and export volume of oil recovered to close to pre-war levels， but in the second half of 2013， armed forces led by Ibrahim Jadran， head of the Petroleum Facilities Guard force in the central region， took over three of Libya’s most important oil terminals in the east and tried to smuggle oil through foreign oil tankers. The revelation led to a sharp decline of Libyan oil production， dealing a huge blow to the central authorities that are heavily dependent on oil export revenues.

　　Against such a complicated backdrop， the chaos in Libya is sure to continue. National reconciliation and political integration may not occur within the foreseeable future.

　　By Qin Tian

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